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RACE AND CLASS:  
A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT WITH 
PROSECUTORS 
 
Christopher Robertson*  
Shima Baradaran Baughman** 
Megan S. Wright*** 
 
Disparities in criminal justice outcomes are well known, and prior observational research has shown 
correlations between the race of defendants and prosecutors’ decisions about how to charge and resolve 
cases. Yet causation is questionable: other factors, including unobserved variation in case facts, may 
account for some of the disparity.  Disparities may also be driven by socio-economic class differences, 
which are highly correlated with race. 
 
This article presents the first blinded, randomized controlled experiment that tests for race and class 
effects in prosecutors’ charging decisions. Case-vignettes are manipulated between-subjects in five 
conditions to test effects of defendants’ race and class status. In the control condition, race and class are 
omitted, which allows baseline measures for bias and pilot-testing of a blinding reform.   Primary outcome 
variables included whether the prosecutor charged a felony, whether the prosecutor would pursue a fine 
or imprisonment, and the amounts thereof.  With 467 actual prosecutors participating nationwide, we 
found that race and class did not have detectable prejudicial effects on prosecutorial decisions.  This 
finding, contrary to the majority of observational studies, suggests that other causes drive known 
disparities in criminal justice outcomes.   
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We seek to understand the causes of the persistent and pervasive racial disparities in 
the American criminal justice system, and in particular whether they are perpetuated 
by the biases of prosecutors, who have profound power and discretion in this system.1  
One potential mechanism for racial disparities is the underlying socioeconomic 
disparities that are correlated with race.2 Few studies have explored socioeconomic 
bias in prosecutorial decisions, and there has been no prior randomized, controlled 
study of prosecutorial decisions to tease apart race and class.  
 
Observational research dominates this field, but causal inference is challenging, due to 
race and class confounds and by the difficulty of observing and coding the severity of 
the underlying conduct and the strength of the evidentiary case. It is also challenging to 
tease apart the underlying causal mechanism in a complex institution with several levels 
of selection and discretion involving police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, defendants, 
and judges each making decisions about whether and how to proceed with a case. This 
article avoids these problems by isolating a few variables and manipulating them 
systematically. 
 
Of particular interest is the prosecutors’ very broad discretion in the initial charging 
decision, since this discretion may reduce the efficacy of downstream policy reforms 
such as sentencing guidelines, which have been enacted to reduce disparities in 
outcomes.3 By collecting hundreds of prosecutorial charging decisions about the same 
case, this article explores how prosecutors use discretion in the initial charging decision 
and whether they punish defendants of certain races or socioeconomic classes more 
than others.  
 
                                                 
1 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND 
REDEMPTION 301 (2014); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 
(2011); L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 
862, 866 (2016); James Forman, Jr. The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 791, 792 (2011); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 
(1995). 
2 See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 137 
(2013) ("[S]ocioeconomic bias may be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial 
decision-making processes can create very real harm for disadvantaged populations.”); Jay M. Spears, 
Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
1493 (1975) (“In our heterogeneous society, socially economic factors are especially likely to create 
powerful prejudices . . . .”); Gwen Van Eijk, Socioeconomic Marginality in Sentencing: The Built-in Bias in Risk 
Assessment Tools and the Reproduction of Social Inequality, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 463, 475 (2016) (noting 
socioeconomic bias in sentencing). 
3 Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and should do more to address the 
relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power . . . . [b]ecause some amount of prosecutorial 
discretion is necessary and inevitable.”).  See also Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing 
Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221 (2005); Russell D. 
Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 447, 483 (2016).  
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It is also important to test upstream policy remedies, such as blinding prosecutors to 
defendant race and class information, which our control-condition allows. 4  Some 
prosecutors’ offices are beginning to experiment with blinding to reduce biases in or 
increase perceived legitimacy of prosecutor decisions, but the reform has not been 
systematically studied.5  
 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on prosecutor decisions 
and prior research on race and class. Part II describes our research methods. Part III 
sets out the results.  Part IV discusses the strengths and limitations of the study, along 
with important implications.  
I.     BACKGROUND 
African Americans, or blacks, comprise 38% of all prisoners, though they only 
constitute 13% of the national population.6 Although some aspects of racial bias in 
America have decreased over the past century, blacks are still imprisoned at almost four 
times the rate of whites and receive 10% longer prison sentences. 7   A variety of 
educational, economic, and cultural factors may contribute to these disparities along 
with implicit bias from decision makers such as legislators, police, prosecutors, judges, 
juries, and parole boards.   
 
The prosecutor may be the government official with the most unreviewable power and 
discretion.8  After the police choose to arrest a subject, the first point of contact with a 
prosecutor is the decision to charge a defendant with a crime.  Since the vast majority 
of cases are resolved short of trial, a second key point of attention is plea bargaining, 
which is also controlled by prosecutors.9  
                                                 
4 Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants' Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious 
Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 72 (2015).  See generally, Jeffrey Fagan, 
Legitimacy and criminal justice-introduction. 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123 (2008).   
5 Timothy Williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate Than Whites. What if Prosecutors 
Didn’t Know Their Race? NY TIMES, June 9, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html 
6 QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217; BOP Statistics: Inmate Race, FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp. 
In 2016, approximately one in 88 blacks were in prison, compared to one in 565 whites. See John 
Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison is Shrinking, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 
12, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-
blacks-and-whites-in-prison/; American Fact Finder: 2016 Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 
1. 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 
7 M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparities in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing 
Consequences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1320 (2014). 
8 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
959, 959 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need 
for the Racial Justice Act. 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35 (1994). 
9 See generally Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal 
Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 868 (2009); Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in 
Criminal Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015); George C. Thomas, Discretion and Criminal 
Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005); Brandon K. Crase, 
When Doing Justice Isn't Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 




Indeed, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through plea-bargaining.10 The 
standard theory is that prosecutors offer and defendants accept plea bargains “in the 
shadow” of the likely trial outcomes for the given case; such that severity of the agreed 
punishment tracks the ease of proving guilt and the heinousness of the crime.  Bushway, 
Redlich, and Norris have shown empirical support for this theory, in an experiment 
involving 378 prosecutors (along with defense attorneys and judges).11  Nonetheless, the 
researchers also observed substantial variation in outcomes, which could not be 
explained by the standard model.   
 
If the case facts and evidentiary strength are not completely driving plea bargain 
outcomes, then what else is?  The literature suggests that race and class may be driving 
outcomes as well. 
A. Effects of Race 
Prosecutors are human, and a wide range of studies have shown that implicit biases 
infect such decisions, and race biases are particularly trenchant, even for individuals who 
have no conscious prejudice.12  For example, one landmark study found that merely 
substituting racialized names on resumes had a dramatic effect on an individual's chance 
of getting a job interview.13  Similarly, the media has shown racial bias in its coverage of 
                                                 
ETHICS 475, 475 (2007); Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal Corporate Charging 
Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 173 (2016);; Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, 
and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017); Shima 
Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1071, 1091 (2017); Kate Stith, 
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L. J.1420, 1470 (2008); 
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1993); Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002); Cynthia Kwei 
Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. 
REV. 105, 107 (1994); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GEO. L. REV. 407, 420–
25 (2008);; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARVARD L. REV.1521, 1521 
(1981); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1010,1011 (2005); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV.105, 109 (1994). 
10 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 
912, 923 (2006). 
11 Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich, and Robert J. Norris, An explicit test of plea bargaining 
in the “shadow of the trial”, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014). 
12 See Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants' Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce 
Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL'Y 69, 72 (2015) (reviewing this 
literature).  
13 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004). 
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violent crimes.14  For instance, a 2018 study found that the media was 95% more likely 
to attribute white shooters’ violent actions to mental illness than black shooters. 15   
Scholars have long asserted that minorities, particularly black males, suffer from 
prosecutorial overcharging.16  Many researchers specifically cite prosecutors’ unchecked 
decision-making power as a major cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice 
system. 17  Nonetheless, racial bias can enter the criminal justice system at other 
junctures.18 
 
Empirical studies have suggested the presence of racial bias in prosecutorial decisions.  
A recent study of federal cases by Rehavi and Starr found that blacks receive about 10% 
longer sentences than whites for comparable crimes, and about half of the gap can be 
explained by prosecutors’ initial charging decisions.19 Local studies have yielded similar 
results, including a 1993 study conducted by Berk and Campbell examining crack 
cocaine charging practices in Los Angeles found that blacks constituted 58% of all 
federal cocaine arrests, but 83% of all federal cocaine charges. 20  Although whites 
accounted for 3% of all crack cocaine arrests, none were federally prosecuted for crack 
related offenses over the two-year period examined. 21   Blacks charged with crack 
                                                 
14 Scott W. Duxberry et al., Mental Illness, the Media, and the Moral Politics of Mass Violence: The Role 
of Race in Mass Shootings Coverage, J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 1 (2018). 
15 Id. at 14 (analyzing 433 randomly selected news articles covering 219 mass shootings from 
2013 to 2015). 
16 See e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory 
Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 559, 559 (1998); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person 
and a Good Prosecutor, 14 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 368–69 (2001); Anthony V. Alfieri, Community 
Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2002); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in 
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 386 (2013)). 
17 James Babikian, Cleaving the Gordian Knot: Implicit Bias, Selective Prosecution, & Charging 
Guidelines, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 140 (2015); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege 
of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) ; Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 172 (2013); Tobin Romero,  Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: 
Fulfilling the Promise of Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043, 2051 (1996); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 302 
(2014).   
18 Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss, An Analysis Of The New York City Police 
Department's “Stop-And-Frisk” Policy In The Context Of Claims Of Racial Bias. 102 J. AM. STATISTICAL 
ASSOC. 813 (2007) (finding “that persons of African and Hispanic descent were stopped more 
frequently than whites, even after controlling for precinct variability and race-specific estimates of crime 
participation.”); Arnold, David, Will Dobbie, and Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions. 133 Q J. 
ECON. 1885 (2018) (finding that judges were biased in bail decisions). 
19 M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparities in Federal Criminal Charging and Its 
Sentencing Consequences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1320 (2014); see also Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, 
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L. 
J. 2 (2013). 
20 Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los 
Angeles, 6 FED. SENT. R. 36, 38 (1993) (examining the relationship between race and cocaine charges 
through arrest data obtained from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (3,084) and charging data from 
the District Attorney’s Office (8,250), and federal agencies (158) and concluding that African-Americans 
arrested for cocaine charges are at greater risk of being charged with federal crimes than other 
offenders). 
21 Id. 
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cocaine offenses had a greater risk of being charged with federal crimes than all other 
offenders.22   
Another study examining racial disparities in pretrial diversion among male felons 
revealed that prosecutors were more likely to grant diversions to white defendants than 
non-white defendants with similar legal characteristics.23  The study concluded that 
prosecutors exhibited a positive preference for diverting white defendants and a 
negative avoidance of diverting black defendants.24 As a result, black defendants were 
42% less likely to receive pretrial diversion than whites. 25  Similar results hold for 
intoxicated driving cases and domestic violence cases.26 
Misdemeanor cases also display these effects.  A study of shoplifters discovered that 
blacks were less likely to have their charges dismissed. 27 A 2014 observational study on 
misdemeanor marijuana cases found that prosecutors were less likely to offer blacks 
reduced charge offers compared to whites. 28  However, most of this variation was 
explained by legal factors, including evidence and arrest circumstances.  Nonetheless, 
black defendants were still more likely to receive custodial offers, after controlling for 
these factors.29  
There are also more comprehensive studies.  Stolzenberg and colleagues observe that 
race may have an effect at multiple points in the criminal justice process, and it may be 
cumulative.  Their metanalysis of data from 65 populous counties found an effect of a 
defendant’s race at two of eight key decision points: likelihood of incarceration and 
                                                 
22 Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los 
Angeles, 6 FED. SENT. R. 36, 38 (1993) (odds of full prosecution were 1.59 times higher for African 
Americans and 2.54 times higher for Hispanics compared to white defendants).   
23 Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among Men 
Charged With Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 211, 223 (2013) (controlling for prior 
record and offense severity, the study found that black, Latino, and Asian/Native American defendants 
are 28%, 13%, and 31% less likely to receive pretrial diversion than white defendants).  
24 Id. at 229. See also Michael J. Leiber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor Sentencing, 14 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y R. 464 (2003) (finding evidence of racial bias among defendants charged with 
misdemeanors; the research indicated that African Americans were 7% more likely than whites to have 
their case given a classification of priority which put them at a disadvantage). 
25 Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among Men 
Charged With Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 211, 223 (2013). 
26 Tana McCoy et al., An Examination of the Influence of Strength of Evidence Variables in the 
Prosecution’s Decision to Dismiss Driving while Intoxicated Cases, 37 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 562, 572 (2012) (finding 
prosecutorial bias on account of race using data of 2,358 driving while intoxicated cases and controlling 
for age, sex, criminal history and charge seriousness); Kris Hennings & Lennete Feder, Criminal 
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Offenses: An Investigation of Factors Predictive of Court Outcomes, 32 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 612, 635 (2005) (examining 4,178 defendants arrested for misdemeanor or felony domestic 
violence offense, finding charging decisions associated with the defendant’s race in multivariate 
models). 
27 Kenneth Adams & Charles R. Cutshall, Refusing to Prosecute Minor Offenses: The Relative Influence 
of Legal and Extralegal Factors, 4 JUST. Q. 595, 606 (1987) (a study of 745 shoplifters). 
28 Besiki Luka Kutateladze, Nancy R. Andiloro, and Brian D. Johnson. Opening Pandora’s box: 
How does defendant race influence plea bargaining? 33 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 398 (2016). 
29 Id., at 399. 
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length of sentence.30 However, a huge cumulative discriminatory effect was evident 
when all decision points were considered in the totality – yielding a 42% increased 
chance of a severe sanction for Black defendants, even after controlling for legal 
factors.31 
A 2016 meta-analysis assessed empirical findings from 26 studies involving a total of 
86,877 criminal cases.32 Minority offenders were 9% more likely to be charged or fully 
prosecuted than white offenders.33  
To the contrary, a few studies have found null results or even a racial disparity in favor 
of minorities. For instance, a 2010 study researching the effects of race, age, and gender 
on prosecutorial decision making found no bias between various race-gender-age 
characteristics with the exception of one category. 34 Several studies examining charging 
in sexual assault cases have also concluded that the race of the defendant does not have 
a statistically significant effect on prosecutors’ initial charging decisions.35  
 
A 1996 study by Barnes and Kingsnorth found that blacks were more likely than whites 
and Hispanics to have their drug case dismissed or rejected by prosecutors.36  On the 
other hand, when sentenced to prison, African Americans and Latinos got longer 
sentences.37  These dynamics reflect the complications of observational research, where 
strength of the evidence and other case facts may vary in ways that are confounding 
with the variables of interest. 
   
A primarily qualitative 2008 study by Wright and Miller compared the racial composition 
of defendants arrested by police with those formally charged by prosecutors. 38 
                                                 
30 Lisa Stolzenberg et al., Race and Cumulative Discrimination in the Prosecution of Criminal Defendants, 
3 RACE & JUST. 275, 286 (2013). 
31 Id. (decision points include whether release on bail was financial, whether bail was denied, 
the bail amount, whether the defendant made bail, whether the defendant was held pretrial, whether the 
case was adjudicated as a felony, whether the defendant received a prison sentence, and the length of 
the imposed prison sentence).  
32 Jawjeong Wu, Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Prosecution: A Meta-Analysis, 43 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 437, 441 (2016). 
33 Id. at 447. 
34 T.W. Franklin, The Intersection of Defendants' Race, Gender, and Age in Prosecutorial Decision 
Making, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 185, 190 (2010) (finding that in felony drug cases from 1998, white defendants 
from thirty to thirty-nine years old were significantly less likely to have their cases dismissed as 
compared to black defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine years old (OR: 0.630, SE: 
0.145)). 
35 Jeffrey W. Spears & Cassia C. Spohn, The Effect of Evidence Factors and Victim Characteristics on 
Prosecutors Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases, 14 JUST. Q. 501, 513 (1997); Dawn Beichner & Cassia 
Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution 
Unit, 16 CRIM.  JUST. POL’Y R. 461 (2005); Cassia C. Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: 
A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate 
Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 677 (2001). 
36 Carole Wolff Barnes & Rodney Kingsnorth, Race, Drugs, and Criminal Sentencing: Hidden Effects 
of the Criminal Law, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 39 (1996) (also finding that Caucasians were more likely than 
African Americans and Latinos to be placed on diversion). 
37 Id. 
38 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 157 (2008). 
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According to the New Orleans data, 12.2% of defendants referred for prosecution by 
police were white and 85.6% were black, while 12.1% of the defendants formally 
charged were white and 85.7% were black. 39  The study concluded that the racial 
composition of defendants entering and exiting the “prosecutorial pipeline were 
virtually identical.” 40  However, the researchers note that the aggregate numbers 
“obscure some interesting shifts in the racial composition of defendants for some 
particular crimes,” as they move through the pipeline from police to prosecution.41 
Prosecutors increased the racial imbalance by at least 2% for aggravated assault, drug, 
and property crimes, while actually reducing the racial imbalance in nine crime 
categories.42  
Other studies examining the later decision to dismiss have also failed to find evidence 
of racial bias. A 1986 study conducted by Albonetti examined how race, among other 
factors, affected prosecutors’ decisions to continue felony prosecution following grand 
indictment. 43   After examining data collected from 4,238 felony cases, Albonetti 
concluded that race did not produce a statistically significant effect on the probability 
of continued prosecution. 44  Around the same time period, Susan Welch conducted a 
similar study examining the dismissal, conviction, and incarceration rates among 10,000 
Hispanic, white, and black male defendants. 45  Welch found “little difference” in 
treatment when using multivariate analysis and controlling for legal and extra-legal 
factors.46   
However, another study of 33,000 cases filed in Los Angeles County examining the 
effect of racial bias on both initial charging and dismissal decisions found evidence of 
racial discrimination at the initial charging stage, but not during the later decision to 
dismiss.47 The authors explained this discrepancy by arguing that dismissals are more 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id, at 157. 
42 Id.  
43 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of 
Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processing, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623, 635 (1986). 
44 Id. See also Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 L. & SOC’Y 
R. 291, 304 (1987) (a follow up study examining 6,014 felony cases, finding that race was not 
significant). 
45 Susan Welch et al., Sentencing: The Influence of Alternative Measures of Prior Record, 22 
CRIMINOLOGY 257, 261 (1984) (controlling for seriousness of offense, prior record, employment status, 
type of attorney, and whether anyone was injured during the crime and concluding that there was little 
difference in dismissal, conviction, and incarceration among Hispanic (28%), white (26%), and black 
(27%) male defendants). 
46 Id. See also Ilene Bernstein et al., Societal Reaction To Deviants: The Case of Criminal Defendants, 42 
AM. SOC. REV. 743, 752 (1977) (race had no significant effect on dismissal and adjournment, and only a 
small effect on sentencing); Moheb Ghali & Meda Chesney-Lind, Gender Bias and the Criminal Justice 
System: An Empirical Investigation, 70 SOC. SCI. REV. 164 (1986) (race was not a significant predictor of 
case dismissal (OR: 1.103)); Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private the Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the 
Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBLEMS 439, 447 (1979) (finding that defendants race did not 
impact prosecutorial discretion but race of the victim did have a significant effect on the decision).   
47 Cassia Sophn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or 
Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 187 (1987)(At the rejection stage, prosecutors failed to 
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visible than rejections and thus “[a]s the process becomes more visible, norms against 
racial discrimination in the process may become more pronounced.”48  
Meta-analyses by Free in 2001 and 2005 argued that even though some studies support 
a nondiscrimination thesis, many were invalid due to flaws in research methods and 
design.49 For example, of the seventeen nondiscrimination studies examined in Free’s 
2001 meta-analysis, approximately three-fourths of the studies combined racial 
categories, over half failed to control for evidentiary strength, a third used aggregate data 
from different offenses, and a fourth limited analysis to a single presentencing 
decision.50 Free concluded that although these deficiencies significantly minimize the 
likelihood of detecting racial disparities, some racial differences still emerged.51  
While there are a few outliers, most of the empirical studies on race and prosecutorial 
decision making have concluded that racial bias exists, particularly in the initial charging 
decision.  Nonetheless, almost all of these studies are observational, and often lack 
independent and granular measures of the key drivers of appropriate discretion, 
underlying crime severity and evidentiary strength.  The studies often also lack granular 
information about other defense characteristics, such as income or wealth, which are 
known mechanisms by which criminal defendants can secure excellent legal 
representation and better outcomes.  Finally, because race and class are significantly 
correlated, these studies can rarely untangle their causal effects, even if class were 
carefully measured.   
B. Effects of Socioeconomic Class 
Researchers have also examined the effect of socioeconomic or class bias on the 
criminal justice system.  Minorities account for almost 80% of the poor in America,52 
and approximately 80% of people charged with a crime are poor.53  
There are several causal mechanisms that may drive class disparities in criminal justice 
outcomes.  First there may be differences in criminality or in the enforcement / 
detection of criminality.  Studies show that criminal involvement among nonwhites is 
                                                 
prosecute 59% of Anglos, 40% of black and 37% of Hispanic defendants (p < 0.01); Prosecutors 
dismissed 34% of the charges against Anglos, 36% against blacks, and 34% against Hispanics.). 
48 Id.  See also Eric P. Baumer et al., The Role of Victim Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder 
Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281 (2000) (random sample of 2,000 murder cases; found that race did not have a 
significant effect during initial screening, but cases involving non-white defendants were more likely to 
be carried forward (less likely to be dismissed)). 
49 Marvin D. Free, Jr., Racial Bias and the American Criminal Justice System: Race and Presentencing 
Revisited, 10 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 195, 200 (2001); Marvin D. Free, Prosecutorial Decision Making and 
Minority Group-Threat Theory, 18 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 7, 24 (2005). 
50 Marvin D. Free, Jr., Racial Bias and the American Criminal Justice System: Race and 
Presentencing Revisited, 10 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 195, 219 (2001). 
51 Id. at 220. 
52 Who is the Poor?, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, 
https://www.irp.wisc.edu/resources/who-is-poor/ (last visited Jul. 31, 2018). 
53 Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2181 
(2013). 
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directly correlated with social class indicators such as personal income, education, 
unemployment, and welfare use.54 For example, prisoners have a median annual income 
of $19,185 prior to imprisonment, which is 41% less than individuals who have never 
been incarcerated.55 Poor communities, particularly poor black neighborhoods, also 
have a much greater police presence as measured by the number of police stops and 
arrests.56  
Second, focusing on prosecutorial decisions, on standard economic theories about 
deterrence of crime, one might expect prosecutors to utilize different punitive strategies 
for wealthier defendants, in contrast to poorer defendants.57  Since incarceration is a 
costly sanction for the state, there will generally be a preference to use fines where 
feasible.58  For poorer defendants with no wealth to pay such fines, prosecutors must 
shift to incarceration.  Dynamically targeting such sanctions may be a rational strategy 
for prosecutors, even if it creates a bias towards incarceration for poorer persons. 
Third, there are also institutional drivers of disparate outcomes on the basis of social 
class, including access to representation.  While the Supreme Court in Gideon v. 
Wainwright sought to decrease socioeconomic disparity within the judicial system by 
providing all criminal defendants with an attorney regardless of their ability to pay, 
criminal prosecutions against the poor increased from 43% in 1962 to 80% by 1992.59  
Although the poor now have a constitutional right to an attorney, many still decline to 
have a public defender appointed to their case. Research conducted in Michigan found 
that 95% of people facing misdemeanors waived the right to an attorney and plead guilty 
because they could not afford the $240 charge for a public defender. 60  As such, 
socioeconomic factors have impacted a defendant’s access to adequate representation 
and seem to have other criminal justice impacts.61  Prosecutors may predict that higher 
class individuals may be more likely to have private representation that resists severe 
sanctions, creating more work for prosecutors. 
                                                 
54 R. Gregory Dunaway et al., The Myth of Social Class and Crime Revisited: An Examination of Class 
and Adult Criminality, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 589 (2000) (concluding that social class was related to criminal 
involvement for nonwhites). 
55 Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the 
Imprisoned, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Jul. 9 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html. 
56 Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2183 
(2013). 
57 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, THE ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIME, pp. 13-68 (1968). 
58 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. The optimal use of fines and Imprisonment. 24 J. PUBLIC 
ECON. 89 (1984). 
59 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
YALE L.J. 1, 7 n.7 (1997). 
60 Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, A Race to the Bottom: Speed & Savings over Due 
Process 32 (2008).  
61 See e.g., Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, Socioeconomic Status and the Sentencing of the 
Traditional Offender, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1993) (finding significant inverse relationship between 
socioeconomic status and length of sentence for the crimes of manslaughter and the possession of 
narcotics). 
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Finally, prosecutors may suffer from out-group bias, viewing higher-class individuals as 
more like themselves and lower-class individuals as unlike themselves.  It may be easier 
to excuse conduct by those from fellow members of the professional class.62 
Socioeconomic bias has manifested at other points in the criminal justice process, 
including convictions and sentencing. 63   Research indicates that socioeconomic 
discrimination is especially prevalent at bail hearings, for example.64  
A study of domestic violence crimes found that socioeconomic status affected 
prosecutorial discretion, as prosecutors were more likely to drop a case if the defendant 
was from a higher socioeconomic status, as defined by an imputed income based on his 
home address.65  Data was obtained from a sample of 4,178 defendants arrested for a 
misdemeanor or felony domestic violence offense in Shelby County, Tennessee.  From 
this data, researchers discovered that prosecutors took 86% of cases in which the 
defendant had an income of less than $20,694, but only 74% of cases with defendants 
from a higher income.   
However, another study researching the socioeconomic status of 175 defendants on 
death row found no significant disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes among 
defendants of different socioeconomic backgrounds. 66 Another study found even more 
mixed results, concluding that earlier case processing decision points (filing charges and 
full prosecution) resulted in more favorable dispositions for defendants of lower 
socioeconomic status while later decision points (convictions and sentencing) favored 
                                                 
62 See generally, Bastian Schiller, Thomas Baumgartner, and Daria Knoc, Intergroup Bias in 
Third-Party Punishment Stems from both Ingroup Favoritism and Outgroup Discrimination, 35 EVOLUTION AND 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 169 (2014). 
63 Freda Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 
10 (1973) (finding that high discrepancies in occupational status between juror and defendant lead to 
higher conviction rates); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic 
Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in 
Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337, 358 (1985) (noting that socioeconomic attributes of the offender 
influenced sentencing decisions indirectly through presentence decisions and case attributes). 
64 See Lucy Nicholson, Not in it for Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 11 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-bail-
system-unfairly (observing that, in California, over 63% of prisoners in county jail are serving time 
because they cannot pay bail); See also SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A 
COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 159 (2018) (noting that, in 
New York, five in six detained defendants had bail set with impossible financial conditions). 
65 Kris Henning & Lynette Feder, Criminal Prosecution of Domestic Violence Offenses: An Investigation 
of Factors Predictive of Court Outcomes, 32 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 612, 631 (2005).  
66 David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death 
Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience, 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 665 
(2002)(Socioeconomic status was measured in terms of the defendant’s occupation; the death 
sentencing rate for low SES defendants was 14% compared to a 32% rate for mid-range SES 
defendants.) 
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defendants from a higher socioeconomic status.67 As a result, the conclusions are mixed 
as far as whether socioeconomic bias exists in criminal justice decision making. 
Although it seems clear that poverty is related to criminal justice outcomes, the few 
existing studies of socioeconomic bias are not sufficient to provide any conclusive 
determination of whether prosecutors suffer from subconscious bias due to class, nor 
teased out its relation to race bias. None of these studies have studied prosecutorial 
charging decisions broadly, and none have used randomized controlled trials. We are 
particularly interested in how race and class interact.  Some have suggested that 
narrowing the economic divide between races may be instrumental to reducing implicit 
racial biases, and also useful to reduce institutional racism.68  These prior studies leave 
an important research gap filled by this study. 
II.    METHODOLOGY 
This study summarizes the results of a randomized controlled experiment in which real 
prosecutors were asked to review realistic but hypothetical cases and make charging 
decisions.  The case-vignettes were manipulated between-subjects in five conditions, a 
2x2 factorial + control design, to test the effects of defendants’ race, white versus black, 
and defendants’ class status, working-class versus college-educated.   
A. Sample Description 
No comprehensive database of U.S. prosecutors is available for research purposes, and 
our initial discussions with prosecutor organizations suggested that research 
collaboration would be unlikely. In order to construct a sample of prosecutors for this 
study, we targeted one or two states (depending on population) in each of the nine 
United States Census regional divisions.  Research assistants collected non-federal 
prosecutor email addresses from prosecutor office websites and state bar associations.  
After these sources were exhausted, state FOIA requests were also used to obtain 
prosecutor names and contact information from all states that had accessible records. 
Information was obtained for at least one respondent from over half of the 50 states.    
 
Prosecutors were then emailed an invitation to participate in the study, with a link to the 
study and an offer of a $5 Amazon gift card.  Respondents were told that, “the purpose 
of this research study is to understand how prosecutors make decisions.”  The protocol 
was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board.  We contacted 
4,484 prosecutors, and 542 completed the study for a 12.09% response rate.  A sample 
size of 467 responses was obtained after eliminating responses that were incomplete or 
were completed in fewer than 10 minutes (suggesting poor engagement with the 
                                                 
67 John D. Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Bilevel Disparities in Court Dispositions for Intimate 
Assault, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 417 (2004).  
68 See e.g., Jeffrey, Fagan, Ellen Slaughter, and Eliot Hartstone. Blind justice? The Impact of Race 
on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 224, 224 (1987) (“the narrowing of social gaps 
may also reduce disparate perceptions of minorities in the juvenile justice system, and restore their 
population balance in delinquent populations”). 
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materials) or greater than 100 minutes (suggesting that they were interrupted and thus 
distracted). 
 
The profile of the jurisdiction and prosecutor characteristics of study respondents is 
shown in Table 1.  Nearly a quarter, 23%, of respondents were lead prosecutors, and 
79% worked in the felony division.  The length of time respondents served as 
prosecutors ranged from less than a year to 45 years with a median length of service of 
10 years. Respondents ranged in age from 27 to 78, with a median age of 45.69 
 
Approximately 65% of the sample were men.  Although there does not appear to be a 
canonical study of the demographics of state prosecutors nationwide, our sample may 
under-represent men, who may in fact constitute 83% of elected state prosecutors.70 
 
Ninety-six percent of respondents were non-Hispanic, 90% were white, 4% were black, 
almost 4% were “other,” and the remainder were Native American or Asian.  Again, 
there appears to be no canonical report of prosecutor demographics, but our sample is 
similar to that reported in one recent study of state prosecutors (where 88.42% were 
white, 2.58% were black, and 1.68% were Hispanic/Latino).71   
 
Just under 8% of respondents were in a jurisdiction of over 2 million, about 11% in a 
jurisdiction of between 1-2 million, 10% in a jurisdiction of 500,000-1 million, 28% in a 
jurisdiction of 100,000-500,000, and 43% in a jurisdiction of less than 100,000.  In 
comparison, national data on prosecutors suggests that our sample over-represents 
prosecutors working in highly-populous jurisdictions (with 18% of our sample in 
jurisdictions over 1M people, compared to 1.8% of prosecutors nationwide in 2007).72  
Similarly, our sample underrepresents prosecutors in less populous regions (with 43% 
in jurisdictions under 100,000 compared to 59.6% nationwide).73 
  
Due to differences in data availability and response rates, the sample primarily consists 
of prosecutors from the Mountain (23%), East North Central (21%), South Atlantic 
(16%), Pacific (12%), West North Central (11%), and East South Central (9%) regions.   
B. Materials and Manipulations 
After conducting a pilot experiment with a Salt Lake City prosecutors office and 
collaborating with experienced prosecutors on design, a case-vignette was constructed 
                                                 
69 See Bushway et al., supra note 11 at 735 (finding an average age of 45.03 years for 
prosecutors in their online research population). 
70 See Justice for All? A Project of the Reflective Democracy Campaign, (2014) 
https://wholeads.us/justice/wp-content/themes/phase2/pdf/key-findings.pdf.  See also Bushway et 
al., supra note 11 at 735 (finding 68.25% of prosecutors in their online research population to be male). 
71 Authors calculators from Justice for All? A Project of the Reflective Democracy Campaign, 
(2014), available at https://wholeads.us/justice/wp-
content/themes/phase2/data/JusticeforAllDataSummer2015.zip.  See also Bushway et al., supra note 
11 at 735 (finding 8.73% of prosecutors in their online research population to be non-white). 
72 Steven W. Perry and Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 - Statistical Tables NCJ-
234211, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics ,1, 
December, 2011.   
73 Id. 
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using two police reports describing an arrest that the officers coded for disorderly 
conduct. These 750-word, two-page reports were realistically designed to include police 
department logos and a standardized form.  
 
The specific vignette in the study is purposely designed to allow a prosecutor to charge 
substantial major crimes, minor crimes, or no crimes at all. It involves an assault, or 
potential aggravated assault, depending on how the prosecutor views the situation and 
individual. It is designed to allow for maximum discretion of the prosecutor. 
 
In the vignette, a slightly intoxicated man is found in a subway station yelling obscenities, 
asking people for money, and brandishing a knife. He is frustrated that no one will give 
him money. At one point, he is angered that a certain woman does not give him money 
after repeated requests and grabs her arm. He does not threaten her specifically but does 
“dangle a knife at his side by his other arm.” The police then arrive and arrest him, and 
he reports having just broken up with his girlfriend. Prosecutors were also provided 
with an abbreviated 623-word two-page statutory code and sentencing guidelines based 
on the laws of a real state, defining these crimes and specifying the punishment ranges 
for each. The study was designed to take participants about 15 minutes to complete. 
 
The case-vignettes were manipulated between-subjects in five conditions, a 2x2 factorial 
+ control design to test effects of defendants’ race, white versus black, and defendants’ 
social class, higher-status accountant versus working-class fast food worker.  In the 
control condition, race and class are redacted altogether in order to assess differences 
from the baseline.  Moreover, a control allows us to pilot-test a potential blinding reform 
to be used in the field, in which real prosecutors would make charging decisions without 
knowledge of these extraneous factors of race and class. 
    
We selected a seemingly race-neutral name, Michael Johnson, for the defendant in all 
conditions.  Prior research on racial bias in employment decisions used racialized names 
as proxies for race.74 The criminal charging domain is distinctive because police reports 
actually have specific blanks for defendant race, for use in identifying a suspect.   
 
The overt race field was manipulated to be black, white, or completely omitted (as if 
there was no field at all).  Each of the officer’s narratives also mentioned the defendant’s 
race through statements like “…two citizens approached me to report an unstable, white 
male of moderate height and build…” and “…upon entering the [train] station I saw a 
white male of medium build and height…”.  Respondents had a total of four 
opportunities to be exposed to the defendant’s race in the non-blinded conditions, as 
there were two police officer reports for this same incident.  In the control condition, 
race references were seamlessly omitted from the reports. Black-line redaction was not 
used in control conditions to avoid drawing attention to the missing information.   
 
                                                 
74 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004). 
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Prior research from the U.S. Census identified occupations with high and low prestige.75 
Two commonplace occupations were selected, an accountant with an average prestige 
score of 5.7 and a fast food worker with an average score of 2.8. Police reports do not 
typically include a field for the defendant’s socioeconomic class, so this variable was 
only manipulated in the police officer’s narrative.  In the non-blinded conditions, the 
first officer’s report included this fact in the very first line stating “on Friday evening, 
March 12, 2013, Michael Johnson, a twenty-nine-year-old fast food worker, was placed 
under arrest…”.   
 
Respondents were first asked which charges they would apply, with ten choices ranging 
from no charges to aggravated assault.  The options were:  No Charges, Deferred 
Prosecution, Disorderly Conduct, Loitering, Public Nuisance, Criminal Nuisance, 
Harassment, Endangerment, Assault, and Aggravated Assault. Respondents then 
indicated if they would press multiple charges.   
 
Next, respondents were asked to “indicate which confinement term and/or monetary 
penalty, if any, you would most likely seek in a plea deal with the suspect (i.e., the term 
and/or penalty that would ultimately satisfy your pursuit of justice). In answering this 
question, you may refer to the sentencing guidelines if you wish.”  Respondents had 
separate blanks for confinement and monetary penalty, and were also able to make notes 
as to suspension of these penalties, which were later coded. Some respondents provided 
ranges, so minimum and maximum values were recorded. Some respondents also 
provided additional comments.  
III.    RESULTS 
Random assignment of 467 prosecutor participants yielded about 90 respondents in the 
control condition and in each race/class cell.  For pooled analyses exploiting our 
factorial design, we had about 180 respondents per race and per class.   
 
As shown in Table 1, the prosecutors responded to the case by charging felonies 15.85% 
of the time.  They demanded monetary penalties 41.50% of the time, and confinement 
27.05% of the time.  The average monetary penalty was $242.75 ($746.78 excluding 
zeros) and the average minimum days of confinement was 21.40 (80.17 excluding zeros).   
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
A. Overall Prosecutorial Severity 
Our primary outcome variable measures the overall severity of the charges and 
punishment that prosecutors recommended.  Although charging decisions can be 
extremely complex, this index variable allows us to avoid multiple-testing problems by 
focusing on a single key hypothesis test, and also accounts for tradeoffs between 
outcomes (e.g., prosecutors who might substitute a harsh monetary penalty for an even 
                                                 
75 TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, MEASURING OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE ON THE 2012 
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY 12, 16 (2014), available at 
http://gss.norc.org/Documents/reports/methodological-
reports/MR122%20Occupational%20Prestige.pdf. 
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harsher confinement term, which would not be captured if each outcome were 
considered separately). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
This severity of punishment variable incorporates whether prosecutors decided to 
charge the defendant, and what monetary penalty and confinement term, if any, was 
recommended.  This variable consists of eight levels, in ascending order of severity:  no 
charges/deferred prosecution (16% of respondents); charges with a suspended sentence 
(37%); charges with a monetary penalty in the bottom third of monetary penalties (7%); 
charges with a monetary penalty in the middle third (8%); charges with a monetary 
penalty in the top third (5%); charges with a confinement recommendation in the lowest 
third of confinement terms (9%); charges with a confinement recommendation in the 
middle third (9%); and charges with a confinement recommendation in the top third 
(9%). Prosecutors may have recommended both a monetary penalty and a term of 
confinement, and in these cases, their recommendation was coded based on their 
confinement response, as the more severe penalty.   
 
A regression model assessed which, if any, factors affected the severity of punishment 
prosecutors recommended.  See Table 2 (reporting linear regression; ordered logit 
models were substantially the same).  We see substantial internal validity:  prosecutors 
who recommended felony charges were 1.2 levels of severity greater than prosecutors 
who did not (p=.000), and for every additional charge recommended, prosecutors 
increased the level of recommended punishment severity by .24 (p=.000).   
 
Figure 1 displays our primary findings on race and class.  None of the experimental 
conditions (or pooled analysis for race or class, discussed below) were statistically 
significant in any of the models.   
 
The confidence intervals around our coefficients provide a sense of the study's statistical 
power, as they rule out substantial effects as being inconsistent with our data.  For 
example, for Black defendants in our pooled analysis, our point estimate of -0.11 for 
severity suggests that they may receive slightly less severe treatment than White 
defendants. At our sample we cannot rule out the possibility of very small positive 
effects, but with the upwards bound of our confidence interval reaching 0.53 (a 10.9% 
increase), we can rule out larger effects as being inconsistent with our observed data.   
 
In our covariates, we also found some incidental effects.  In the complete model, New 
England prosecutors were 1.28 levels of severity below Mountain region prosecutors 
(p=.029), prosecutors who work in misdemeanor or other nonfelony divisions were half 
a level of severity below felony prosecutors (p=.088), and for every year of age, 
prosecutors decreased their level of recommended punishment severity by .03 (p=.047).   
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B. Number of Charges 
For robustness, to determine whether race or class biases may be expressed in more 
granular ways, we examined a range of individual outcome variables, first being the 
number of charges prosecutors would bring against the hypothetical defendant.  Almost 
all (97%) of prosecutors filed at least one charge.  The mean number of charges was 
3.16 [CI 2.98, 3.33], and excluding the 15 prosecutors who declined to bring charges, 
the mean number of charges was 3.26 [CI 3.09, 3.44].  The number of charges ranged 
from 1-11 (the maximum number of charges possible was 16). The most common 
number of charges were two (26%), three (20%), and four (15%).   
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
A linear regression was conducted to assess whether other factors, such as jurisdiction 
and prosecutor characteristics, were important to the number of charges that 
prosecutors chose to file.  See Table 3.  In the first model, containing only the 
experimental conditions, regression results show that the black accountant experimental 
condition is different from the control condition with marginal statistical significance; 
that is, prosecutors recommend about one-half more charges for the defendant who is 
a black accountant (p=.094). When jurisdiction characteristics are added, and in the 
complete model, none of the experimental conditions are statistically different from the 
control.    
C. Felony Charging 
For additional robustness, we separately examined whether a prosecutor would charge 
the defendant with a felony versus a misdemeanor (or no charge at all), and whether this 
would differ by experimental condition.  Only 16% of prosecutors opted to charge the 
defendant with aggravated assault (the clear felony available), whereas 84% opted for 
charges that were a misdemeanor only (or could be either a felony or a misdemeanor).  
In a simple bivariate test, there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
experimental conditions and the decision to charge a felony.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
A binary logistic regression was conducted to assess whether other factors were 
important to the prosecutors’ decision to charge a felony or not.  See Table 4.  Only one 
of the experimental conditions is (marginally) statistically different from the control 
condition: when the defendant was a white accountant, he was less likely to be charged 
with a felony (odds ratio=.45; p=.067) compared to the control condition. This finding 
could suggest a potential existence of class bias, in that white individuals of higher 
socioeconomic status received less harsh treatment than the individuals with 
unidentified race.   
 
The next model added jurisdiction-specific variables such as the size of respondents’ 
geographic region, office size, and jurisdiction size.  The white accountant condition 
remains marginally statistically different from the control condition (odds ratio=.43; 
p=.065).   Adding prosecutor characteristics, such as age, race, ethnicity, sex, length of 
job experience, and type of prosecutor, does not change the outcome (odds ratio=.40, 
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p=.06), and the black fast food condition also becomes marginally significant (odds 
ratio=.44, p=.09).   The final model included information regarding whether the 
prosecutor recommended a monetary penalty and confinement, and the number of total 
charges.  Regression results show the same marginal effects.  We also see substitution 
effects:  prosecutors who recommend a monetary penalty are less likely to charge a 
felony (odds ratio=.44, p=.015), and some complements, in that prosecutors who 
recommend confinement are more likely to charge a felony (odds ratio=2.52, p=.005).  
Unsurprisingly, prosecutors who recommend more charges are more likely to charge a 
felony (odds ration=1.41, p=.000). 
D. Monetary Penalties 
For further robustness, the study separately investigated whether a prosecutor would 
recommend a monetary penalty, and if so, the dollar amount of the penalty, and whether 
this would differ by experimental condition.  About 41% of prosecutors opted to 
recommend a monetary penalty, whereas 59% opted for no monetary penalty. The mean 
monetary penalty recommended, including all prosecutors who recommended no 
monetary penalty, was $242.75 [CI $191.90, $293.60], or when excluding prosecutors 
who did not recommend a monetary penalty, the mean recommended amount was 
$640.25 [CI $530.77, $749.73].  Of those prosecutors that recommended a monetary 
penalty, the amount recommended ranged from $10 to $5,000, and the most common 
recommended amount was $500 (55/160 prosecutors recommended) with common 
recommendations of $100, $200, $250, $750, and $1,000.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE.] 
 
A binary logistic regression was conducted to assess whether other factors were 
important to the prosecutors’ decision to recommend any monetary penalty or not.  See 
Table 5.  Experimental conditions are not statistically different from the control 
condition in any model.    
 
A linear regression was conducted to assess whether other factors were important to the 
dollar amount that prosecutors chose to recommend.  See Table 6.  Experimental 
conditions are not statistically different from the control condition in any model.  We 
did find that more punitive prosecutors recommended more severe punishments, in that 
prosecutors who sought a term of confinement recommended about $178 more in 
monetary penalties as well (p=.006).   
E. Confinement 
For robustness, we separately examined whether a prosecutor would recommend a term 
of confinement, and if so, the minimum days of confinement, and whether this would 
differ by experimental condition. About 27% of prosecutors recommended 
confinement, whereas 73% opted for no confinement. The mean recommended 
minimum days of confinement, including prosecutors who recommended no 
confinement, was just over 21 (21.40, CI [15.02, 27.79]), or when excluding prosecutors 
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who did not recommend confinement, 80.17 days [CI 59.51, 100.83]. 76  Of those 
prosecutors that recommended confinement, the minimum number of days of 
confinement recommended ranged from two to 720 days, and the most common 
recommended amount was 30 days (31/122 prosecutors recommended) with common 
recommendations of 10, 90, and 180 days.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE.] 
[INSERT TABLE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE.] 
 
A binary logistic regression was conducted to assess whether other factors were 
important to the prosecutors’ decision to recommend any confinement.  See Table 7.  
The initial model contained only primary independent variables of interest, and the other 
models added in stages jurisdiction characteristics, prosecutor characteristics, and 
penalty recommendations, as described earlier.  Regression results show that the 
experimental conditions are not statistically different from the control condition in any 
model.   
 
A linear regression assessed whether other factors were important to the minimum number 
of days of confinement that prosecutors chose to recommend.  See Table 8.  Nothing 
was statistically significant in the basic model.  In the complete model, which includes 
other penalty recommendations, with marginal significance, prosecutors deciding on 
penalties for defendants who were described as black fast food workers recommended 
almost 20 more days than for defendants in the control condition, without race and class 
information given (p=.059).  Nonwhite prosecutors recommended about 27 fewer days 
of confinement than white prosecutors (p=.016), and Hispanic prosecutors 
recommended almost 57 more days of confinement than non-Hispanic prosecutors 
(p=.000).  Finally, unsurprisingly, prosecutors who charged a felony recommended 
almost 71 more days of confinement (p=.000).   
 
There were a few extreme values.  For example, one prosecutor recommended 720 days 
of confinement, and eight prosecutors recommended 365 days of confinement.  The 
95% of the distribution was 180 days or less, and if that is used as a ceiling, then the 
none of the experimental conditions are different from the control in any of the models.  
Prosecutors may have been influenced by race in their likelihood of imposing a severe 
sentence greater than 180 days.  A Fisher Exact Tests yielded p = .064 for difference 
between black fast food workers and white accountant defendant on this ad-hoc 
analysis. Readers should not make inferences of causality from such ad-hoc testing.   
F. Pooled Analyses 
We also used a factorial design to maximize the efficiency of our study.  Because we 
generally found null effects in the analyses of experimental cells (race-class pairings, 
such as Black Accountant), we also pooled across the classes to test race effects with 
greater power, and pooled across the races to test class effects with greater power.  
                                                 
76 If nine extreme values are recoded to a maximum value of 95% percentile of the 
distribution, or 180 days, when prosecutors recommend confinement, the mean minimum number of 
days recommended becomes 63.05 [CI 51.15, 74.95]. 
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The overall severity outcomes are shown in Figure 1 and are indistinguishable from 
the null.   
 
We also conducted pooled analyses for the individual outcomes (e.g., chance of 
confinement) but do not display regression tables.  Instead Figures 2 and 3 show 
forest plots of the results, with odds ratios for binary outcomes and linear regression 
coefficients for scalar outcomes (and their 95% confidence intervals).  None of the 
outcomes are distinguishable from the null, and as a whole do not suggest race or class 
effects.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
IV.    DISCUSSION 
We review the limitations of our methodological approach, and remark on both the 
severity and variability we observed in charging identical cases.  We also explore the 
relevance of our findings for policy.  
A. Limitations 
A randomized method has the advantage of allowing causal inference, and the 
population of real prosecutors reduces the inferential gap. Vignette-based research has 
become a staple of social science, as it has been shown to be a valid method for 
predicting real-world behavior. 77   However, there are important methodological 
limitations.   
 
Although practicing prosecutors were consulted in order to design realistic vignettes, 
any particular fact pattern may not be generalizable to the wide range of real-world 
situations that prosecutors face.  This case represented a fairly minor crime, unlike many 
drug crimes or violent crimes, which can lead to greater penalties. This lack of severity 
may have also created a floor, with 73% of responding prosecutors opting for no 
confinement and 59% opting for no monetary penalty.  A more severe crime may have 
revealed more variability among the prosecutors in our sample. 
 
Furthermore, the study’s manipulations may not have been perfectly calibrated to the 
actual real-world salience of race and class.  For example, defendant mugshots and 
racialized names could have created stronger impressions of race.  Defendants with high 
socio-economic status may be able to communicate this fact to the prosecutor in other 
ways, including through choice of defense counsel and communications by defense 
counsel.  Finally, although this Article sometimes refers to “class” as shorthand, it bears 
emphasis that the defendant’s job is as an imperfect proxy of socioeconomic status.   
 
                                                 
77 JENS HAINMUELLER ET AL., VALIDATING VIGNETTE AND CONJOINT SURVEY 
EXPERIMENTS AGAINST REAL-WORLD BEHAVIOR 2395–400 (2015); Lisa Wallander, 25 Years of Factorial 
Surveys in Sociology: A Review, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 505, (2009). 
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By typical experimental research standards this was a relatively large study, and we used 
a fully-crossed factorial design to maximize potential power (with about 180 
respondents assigned to each race and each class).  Although our primary analyses broke 
out each race-class pairing (e.g., black accountant), we also performed regressions 
entering race and class as dummy variables, which effectively pooled across 
experimental conditions, exploiting the factorial design.  Even here, however, we found 
no significant effects.  Our confidence intervals allow that there may nonetheless be 
small effects, but there was no consistent trend of insignificant findings of race or class 
bias, and in some cases the signs were contrary to the hypothesized effect (see e.g., Table 
2 Model 3, showing both Black defendants receiving less severe punishment than the 
White defendants).   
 
It is worth highlighting that our primary regression models used the control condition 
as the base case (i.e., omitted category), and thus the regression coefficients estimate 
differences against that counterfactual where class and race are occluded.  These 
coefficients do not directly estimate whether there is disparate treatment of black versus 
white or high class versus low class individuals.  Our alternative specifications (not 
shown), using white/black contrasts did not yield substantially different results.   
 
Given the generally null results, a mathematical adjustment for multiple testing was not 
applied.78  Nonetheless, readers should be aware that multiple dependent variables and 
multiple models increases the risk of false positives.  Indeed, Tables 2-8 show 28 
different specifications testing the race variable, and we found only one instance at the 
p=0.05 level in which whites may have received leniency.  We would expect this rate 
out of mere chance.  (Similarly, when we pool the race variable across both class levels, 
and run the 28 specifications (not shown), we find nothing more than the null 
hypothesis would predict.)  
 
Additionally, although participants were recruited from a nationwide pool of 
prosecutors, and were incentivized to participate, this study is not a probability-based 
sample of American prosecutors.  It is particularly worrisome that we had a relatively 
low response rate of 12.9%.  Nonetheless, unlike a simple survey, our experimental 
hypotheses tests depend on intra-sample comparisons with random-assignment across 
conditions. 
 
Prosecutors also may have behaved differently in this experimental setting than they do 
in the real world.  Knowing that their responses were being observed, prosecutors may 
have attempted to give more socially-desirable answers than they otherwise would.79   
The blinded, randomized, between-subjects design reduces the ability of individuals to 
                                                 
78 See Aickin, Mikel & Helen Gensler, Adjusting for multiple testing when reporting research results: the 
Bonferroni vs Holm methods. 86 AM. J. PUB HEALTH 726 (1996).   
79 See Norbert Schwarz, Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers. 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 93 
(1999).  See also Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and Information 
Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 805 (1975) 
(showing that judges in fact behaved differently than they said they would in survey responses).   
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provide socially-desirable answers. 80  Implicit bias generally cannot be switched on and 
off, or overcome by simply being observed.81   
 
To be sure, the prosecutors were not simply asked whether they would be more punitive 
towards blacks.  Instead, individuals were asked to decide the specific case presented, 
which had innumerable variables in its rich vignette with open-ended responses, making 
it far from obvious to determine what would be the socially desirable response.  Even 
if prosecutors did try to be more lenient on black defendants, to counteract their implicit 
bias, it would be difficult to achieve the same level of severity imposed by other 
prosecutors in the white-defendant conditions.  If this heuristic is successful, perhaps 
prosecutors deploy it just as successfully in their real world decisions?  Notwithstanding 
the anonymity of our experiment, perhaps the fact of our observation is more salient 
here than in the real world.  If monitoring of prosecutors improves behavior, this 
suggests that real-world monitoring interventions may be worthwhile.82 
 
Prosecutors may have discussed the study with other potential respondents in their 
offices or otherwise, which may have broken our blind.  The data indicated evidence of 
respondents clicking through the survey very quickly as if seeking to preview it, which 
is typical of online research.  Our between-subjects randomized design helps minimize 
the risk that any individual could determine what factors were manipulated, and we did 
not reveal our purpose at the end of the study.  Our national research population and 
direct recruitment strategy (rather than, say using an email list serve or a snowball 
sample) reduces the risk of cross-talk. 
 
Finally, the study cannot unequivocally determine whether respondents failed to notice 
the race and class of the defendants, or they noticed but did not respond to these factors.  
In a laboratory setting, prosecutors would have been asked manipulation-check 
questions to assess their ability to recall the race and class of the defendant in each 
vignette. This strategy was not used here, due to concerns that doing so would break 
the blind, and cause respondents to communicate with future respondents about the 
purpose of the study. 
B. Implications 
As we have seen, prosecutors have broad discretion and little direction, and they in fact 
react in highly-variable ways to the same case.  This is a domain where one might expect 
bias to flourish.  As L. Song Richardson has recently pointed out, “implicit biases 
flourish in situations where individuals make decisions quickly and on the basis of 
limited information.”83   
                                                 
80 See Hainmueller et al., supra note 77; Wallander supra note 77.   
81 See e.g., Justin Levinson, Cai Huajian, & Danielle Young, Guilty by implicit racial bias: The 
guilty/not guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010) (finding race biases using the 
implicit attitudes test, and correlating them with behavior). 
82 See Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of" Racially 
Motivated Violence," 99 YALE LAW J. 845, 855 (1990) (calling for monitoring of prosecutors to reduce 
unconscious bias). 
83 L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 
862, 866 (2016).  See also Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different shades of bias: Skin tone, implicit 




Oddly enough, however, our data and analyses do not support the proposition that 
implicit bias arising from prosecutors’ awareness of race is the primary driver of the 
indisputable racial disparities that exist in criminal justice outcomes.  Our novel 
experimental design, which separately manipulated race and class, had the potential to 
shed light on the interaction of these factors.  Yet, this study’s null result on the class 
variable further suggests that underlying economic disparities, which have a strong 
association with race, are not driving prosecutorial decisions in a simplistic way.  Instead, 
systematic and institutionalized racism and classism may be playing a larger role.      
 
That said, race and class are not simple phenomena. Some have recently challenged 
whether race can even be studied in the counterfactual model of the randomized 
experiment and the social science methods that seek to approach that ideal.84   Our 
experiment only tests the prosecutor's simulated behavior after being exposed to certain 
words in the police reports.  
 
We extend prior work demonstrating why race scholars must dig deep into the 
mechanisms driving racial disparities. McIntyre and Baradaran demonstrated in the 
context of pretrial detention that with a naïve regression analysis, one would conclude 
significant racial discrimination.85 However, once one adequately accounts for prior 
history and forecasts recidivism, race has very little explanatory effect. Similarly, our 
work shows that while there are observable racial differences in charging between races, 
the race effects are small to nonexistent when examined closely through a randomized 
experiment. 
 
We also remind readers that we did find marginally significant race/class effects in some 
conditions and some specifications, and our statistical power is unable to rule out smaller 
effects across the board.  We only conclude that our research does not support the 
proposition that implicit race and class biases are a large driver of prosecutorial charging 
decisions in the sort of case we studied.   
 
Since we cannot rule out the possibility that awareness of race and class have modest 
effects on charging decisions, there remains a risk of race-biased decisions.  From a 
                                                 
racial bias, and judgments of ambiguous evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010); Charles Lawrence, The Id, The 
Ego, and  Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 341 (1987); Sheri 
Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1019 (1988). 
84 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About 
Detecting Racial Discrimination (Feb. 1, 2018) (unpublished), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050650 (arguing that the counterfactual model is “wrong because it is 
based on a flawed theory of (1) what the word race references and how it produces effects in the world 
and (2) what we mean when we say it is bad to make important decisions ‘because of race.’”).  See also 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders. 98 GEO. LAW. J. 2227, 2229 (2000) (“The actions of 
prosecutors and defense lawyers reflect and refashion cultural artifacts (caste and color) and social 
norms (character and community). Acting as sociolegal agents, prosecutors and defenders infuse legal 
discourse with images and tropes gleaned outside the law, inscribing cultural and social meaning into 
law.”) 
85 Frank McIntyre and Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction & Pretrial Detention. 10 J. EMP. LEG. 
STUD. 741 (2013) 
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Bayesian perspective, that risk is buttressed by a wealth of background research showing 
racial bias in a range of situations.  Thus, notwithstanding the null results, it may still be 
worthwhile to remove race information from the reports provided to prosecutors, as 
some have proposed and one district is now trying.86  An individual cannot be biased by 
information that she did not receive.  Blinding is valuable both for the sake of preventing 
bias, but also to maintain trust, confidence, and legitimacy.   
 
Our study’s control condition can be viewed as a pilot that proves one part of the 
feasibility of redacting race and class information from police reports. The study 
included race in a long list of information that prosecutors could consider when making 
charging decisions, and asked respondents to mark all of the factors they needed.  The 
vast majority did not include race as a necessary factor, a finding that supports the 
proposition that its inclusion in police dossiers is gratuitous, at least for the prosecutor’s 
function (although some prosecutors noted that it was important in determining 
whether to charge a hate crime).  To the extent that information technology allows the 
data to be collected for police identification purposes but redacted for prosecutorial 
decision making, this study supports the feasibility of such a reform.  Additional research 
is needed to explore whether blinding of prosecutors’ decisions may improve 
perceptions that prosecutors decide fairly. 
 
However, the data includes suggestive trends that prosecutors were more severe in the 
blinded control condition (i.e., less severe in most of the other conditions), when race 
and class were occluded. See e.g., Table 2.  Notably, the study only had one control 
condition and it occluded both variables, so it is impossible to distinguish which 
occlusion is driving this potential affect.  Furthermore, it is possible that being reminded 
that the defendant has a job, regardless of whether the particular job has markings of 
class and privilege, tends to humanize the defendant and mitigate a prosecutor’s 
tendency to pursue jail-time and the felony charges that go with it.   
 
Indeed, for a person who does have a job, incarceration can cause additional collateral 
consequences compared to those who don’t have a job, both in terms of marginal lost 
hours of work but also given the risk of being fired altogether.87  Thus it may seem 
rational for prosecutors to consider this information, arguably unlike race information.  
Further research might explore whether prosecutors and police officers should 
purposefully include such job information to reduce incarceration rates. Doing so may 
however exacerbate disparities, where the underlying unemployment rate suffers from 
a racial disparity too.     
CONCLUSION   
We know that there are huge racial and socioeconomic disparities in criminal justice 
outcomes, but our research does not suggest that they are primarily due to implicit biases 
                                                 
86 See notes 4 & 5 supra. 
87 See Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and Their 
Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 299, 317 (2005); John Hagan & 
Dinovitzer Ronit, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & 
JUST. 121, 137 (1999); ; Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (2018) 
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by prosecutors.  We have determined that severe and variable prosecutorial decisions 
occur with minimal oversight or institutional guidance. Policymakers must consider 
reforms of the criminal justice process and more fundamental and structural solutions 
to address systemic and institutionalized racism and classism.      
  






Note:  For each experimental condition, the predicted value is shown on an 8-level outcome variable, which indexes whether charges were brought, whether deferred, 
whether monetary penalty sought and dollar amount thereof (in tertiles), and whether confinement sought and time thereof (in tertiles).  Predicted values adjusted for 
jurisdiction characteristics and prosecutor characteristics as shown in Model 3 below.  95% confidence intervals shown.  































Figure 1 – Severity of Prosecutors’ Charging and Punishment Intentions by Experimental Conditions and Factorial 
Race/Class Variables Pooled (with sample size shown) 





Note:  Coefficients are based on regression models including prosecutor and jurisdiction characteristics (as in Model 3 shown below).  To depict on common scale, 
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Figure 2 – Forest Plot Summarizing Pooled Analyses of Race and Class Scalar Outcomes  




Note:  Odds ratios are based on regression models including prosecutor and jurisdiction characteristics (as in Model 3 shown below).  
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Table 1 -- Descriptive Statistics 
  Percent of Sample or Mean 
Recommended Disposition of Case    
 Felony Charge 15.85% 
 Monetary Penalty 41.50% 
 Average Amount of Monetary Penalty $242.75 
 Confinement 27.05% 
 Average Minimum Days of Confinement 21.40 days 
Jurisdiction Characteristics    
 Average Size of Office 31.60 prosecutors 
 Size of Jurisdiction    
    Over 2,000,000 people 7.54% 
    1,000,000-2,000,000 people 10.56% 
    500,000-1,000,000 people 10.13% 
    100,000-500,000 people 28.23% 
    Less than 100,000 people 43.53% 
 Region     
    New England 4.30% 
    Middle Atlantic 3.44% 
    Midwest 21.08% 
    West North Central 11.18% 
    South Atlantic 15.70% 
    East South Central 8.60% 
    West South Central  1.08% 
    Mountain 22.80% 
    Pacific 11.83% 
Prosecutor Characteristics    
 Average Number of Years as Prosecutor 12.70 years 
 Head Prosecutor 22.96% 
 Average Age 46.18 years 
 Gender    
    Male 65.52% 
    Female 34.48% 
 Race    
    White 90.41% 
    Black/African American 4.14% 
    American Indian/Alaska Native .65% 
    Asian .65% 
    Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander .22% 
    Other 3.92% 
 Hispanic    
    No 96.09% 
    Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano 1.30% 
    Puerto Rican .22% 
    Cuban 1.09% 
    Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino 1.30% 
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Table 2 – Severity of Punishment Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental Conditions and 
Jurisdiction Characteristics 
Model 3: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, and Prosecutor 
Characteristics 
Model 4: Experimental Conditions, 
Jurisdiction Characteristics, 
Prosecutor Characteristics, and 
Penalty Recommendations 
 Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  -.01 [-.71, .70]  -.08 [-.80, .63]  -.09 [-.82, .64]  -.08 [-.78, .62]  
 Black Fast food  -.04 [-.76, .69]  -.11 [-.84, .62]   -.12 [-.87, .63]  -.02 [-.74, .70]  
 White Accountant  .01 [-.71, .73]  -.05 [-.77, .67]  -.06 [-.79, .68]  .02 [-.68, .73]     
 White Fast food .21 [-.50, .92]  .15 [-.56, .86]  .00 [-.72, .73]  -.02 [-.71, .68]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    .00 [-.01, .01]  .00 [-.01, .01]  .00 [-.00, .01]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  .14 [-.13, .42]  .13 [-.17, .42]  .17 [-.11, .45]  
 New England  -1.69 [-2.84, -.53] ** -1.53 [-2.72, -.34] * -1.28 [-2.42, -.13] * 
 Middle Atlantic  .17 [-1.19, 1.54]  .48 [-.89, 1.85]  .24 [-1.09, 1.57]  
 Midwest  -.80 [-1.52, -.08] * -.59 [-1.34, .16]  -.28 [-1.01, .44]  
 West North Central  -.21 [-1.08, .66]  -.09 [-1.02, .83]  -.07 [-.96, .82]  
 South Atlantic  .11 [-.61, .83]  .23 [-.53, 1.00]  -.05 [-.78, .69]  
 East South Central  -.53 [-1.43, .37]  -.28 [-1.19, .63]  -.11 [-.98, .77]  
 West South Central  -1.39 [-3.74, .97]  -1.24 [-3.60, 1.12]  -1.00 [-3.26, 1.26]  
 Pacific                     .27 [-.58, 1.12]                  .64 [-.26, 1.54] .67 [-.19, 1.53]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      .02 [-.02, .05]  .03 [-.01, .06]  
 Felony Division      -.67 [-1.27, -.07] * -.50 [-1.08, .08] + 
 Head Prosecutor                       -.28 [-.95, .39] -.14 [-.78, .51]  
 Age       -.03 [-.06, .01]  -.03 [-.06, -.00] * 
 Female      -.01 [-.51, .49]  -.06 [-.54, .42]  
 Not White     -.35 [-1.17, .46]  -.42 [-1.20, .36]  
 Hispanic     .72 [-.45, 1.88]  .65 [-.47, 1.76]  
Penalty Recommendations         
 Felony Charge       1.20 [.55, 1.85] *** 
 Number of Charges       .24 [.12, .37] *** 
 Constant 3.51 [3.01, 4.01] *** 3.24 [1.92, 4.55] *** 4.87 [2.54, 7.19] *** 3.50 [1.23, 5.77] ** 
 R - squared .0015 .0464 .0783 .1600 
 N= 411 408 389 389 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level, ***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
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Table 3 – Total Number of Charges Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental Conditions and 
Jurisdiction Characteristics 
Model 3: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, and Prosecutor 
Characteristics 
Model 4: Experimental Conditions, 
Jurisdiction Characteristics, 
Prosecutor Characteristics, and 
Penalty Recommendations 
 Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  .47 [-.08, 1.03] + .34 [-.20, .89]  .32 [-.25, .88]  .39 [-.16, .94]  
 Black Fast food  .32 [-.25, .89]  .12 [-.44, .68]   .13 [-.45, .71]  .21 [-.36, .78]  
 White Accountant  .16 [-.41, .73]  .08 [-.47, .64]  .04 [-.53, .62]  .33 [-.23, .89]     
 White Fast food .40 [-.16, .95]  .31 [-.23, .85]  .27 [-.29, .83]  .38 [-.17, .93]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    -.00 [-.01, .00]  -.00 [-.01, .00]  -.00 [-.01, .00]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  -.00 [-.22, .22]  -.10 [-.33, .13]  -.05 [-.28, .17]  
 New England  -.21 [-1.14, .72]  -.16 [-1.13, .81]  .25 [-.68, 1.18]  
 Middle Atlantic  1.33 [.32, 2.33] ** 1.4 [.37, 2.43] ** 1.64 [.63, 2.64] *** 
 Midwest  -.62 [-1.16, -.08] * -.61 [1.18, -.03] * -.63 [-1.19, -.07] * 
 West North Central  .26 [-.39, .92]  .19 [-.52, .90]  -.32 [-.38, 1.01]  
 South Atlantic  .70 [.14, 1.27] * .82 [.20, 1.43] ** .76 [.18, 1.35] * 
 East South Central  -.17 [-.88, .54]  -.15 [-.88, .58]  .00 [-.69, .70]  
 West South Central  .04 [-1.67, 1.76]  .05 [-1.71, 1.81]  .15 [-1.53, 1.82]  
 Pacific                       .04 [-.61, .68]                    .18 [-.52, .88] .11 [-.57, .78]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      -.03 [-.06, -.002] * -.03 [-.06, -.00] * 
 Felony Division      -.35 [-.81, .11]  -.10 [-.55, .36]  
 Head Prosecutor                     -.49 [-1.00, .03]     + -.45 [-.95, .06] + 
 Age       .02 [-.00, .05] + .02 [-.00, .05] + 
 Female      .27 [-.13, .66]  .27 [-.11, .65]  
 Not White     .39 [-.26, 1.04]  .37 [-.25, 1.00]  
 Hispanic     .39 [-.54, 1.33]  .43 [-.46, 1.32]  
Penalty Recommendations         
 Confinement       .50 [.08, .91] * 
 Felony Charge 





 1.17 [.66, 1.69] 
.24 [-.13, .62] 
*** 
 Constant 2.88 [2.49, 3.28] *** 3.04 [2.00, 4.08] *** 3.32 [1.47, 5.17] *** 2.40 [.59, 4.21] ** 
 R - squared .0077 .0722 .1128 .2045 
 N= 467 461                          434                                         411 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level, ***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
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Table 4 -- Felony Charge (Yes/No) Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category     
  Model 1: 
Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental 
Conditions and Jurisdiction 
Characteristics 




Model 4: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, Prosecutor 
Characteristics, and Penalty 
Recommendations 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  .90 [.44, 1.84]  .79 [.36, 1.74]  .71 [.31, 1.67]  .66 [.26, 1.64]  
 Black Fast food  .51 [.22, 1.16]  .51 [.21, 1.21]  .44 [.17, 1.14] + .36 [.13, 1.03] + 
 White Accountant  .45 [.19, 1.06] + .43 [.18, 1.05] + .40 [.15, 1.04] + .37 [.13, 1.03] + 
 White Fast food .92 [.45, 1.89]  .94 [.44, 2.01]  .90 [.40, 2.01]  .81 [.34, 1.94]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    1.00 [.99, 1.01]  1.00 [.99, 1.01]  1.00 [.99, 1.01]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  .85 [.64, 1.13]  .87 [.63, 1.20]  .92 [.64, 1.32]  
 New England  omitted  omitted  omitted  
 Middle Atlantic  .27 [.03, 2.24]  .36 [.04, 3.11]  .10 [.01, 1.30] + 
 Midwest  .30 [.12, .76] * .39 [.15, 1.03] + .48 [.16, 1.42]  
 West North Central  .56 [.20, 1.54]  .61[.20, 1.91]  .51 [.14, 1.78]  
 South Atlantic  1.70 [.85, 3.42]  1.48 [.67, 3.28]  1.12 [.48, 2.64]  
 East South Central  .31 [.08, 1.12] + .36 [.09, 1.35]  .43 [.11, 1.70]  
 West South Central  omitted  omitted  omitted  
 Pacific  .75 [.30, 1.87]        .80 [.29, 2.18] .65 [.22, 1.94]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      .99 [.94, 1.04]  1.00 [.95, 1.06]  
 Felony Division      .43 [.17, 1.06] + .47 [.18, 1.26]  
 Head Prosecutor               .74 [.31, 1.80] 1.06 [.38, 2.94]  
 Age       .99 [.95, 1.03]  .97 [.93, 1.01]  
 Female      1.02 [.55, 1.88]  .84 [.43, 1.62]  
 Not White     1.11 [.43, 2.86]  1.16 [.42, 3.24]  
 Hispanic     .75 [.19, 2.92]  .42 [.10, 1.78]  
Penalty Recommendations         
 Monetary Penalty       0.44 [.23, .85] ** 
 Confinement       2.52 [1.31, 4.82] * 
 Number of Charges       1.41 [1.20, 1.65] *** 
 Constant .25 [.15, .41] *** .72 [.19, 2.72]  2.30 [.12, 42.57]  .86 [.03, 23.68]  
 Pseudo R - squared .0152 .0818 .0874 .1863 
 N= 467 437 410 387 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level,  
***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
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Table 5 -- Monetary Penalty Recommendation (Yes/No) Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: 
Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental 
Conditions and Jurisdiction 
Characteristics 




Model 4: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, Prosecutor 
Characteristics, and Penalty 
Recommendations 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  1.37 [.77, 2.48]  1.48 [.80, 2.75]  1.35 [.71, 2.57]  1.45 [.75, 2.82]  
 Black Fast food  1.39 [.76, 2.53]  1.33 [.71, 2.52]  1.13 [.58, 2.21]  1.15 [.58, 2.32]  
 White Accountant  1.20 [.66, 2.20]  1.19 [.63, 2.23]  1.12 [.58, 2.18]  1.15 [.58, 2.28]     
 White Fast food .81 [.44, 1.50] * .78 [.42, 1.46]  .70 [.36, 1.35]  .74 [.37, 1.45]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    1.00 [.99, 1.00]  1.00 [.99, 1.01]  1.00 [.99, 1.00]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  1.12 [.88, 1.44]  1.18 [.90, 1.54]  1.13 [.85, 1.50]  
 New England  .07 [.01, .54] * .06 [.01, .50] ** .06 [.01, .50] ** 
 Middle Atlantic  .58 [.18, 1.84]  .57 [.17, 1.89]  .41 [.12, 1.44]  
 Midwest  .86 [.47, 1.58]  .81 [.42, 1.55]  .83 [.42, 1.64]  
 West North Central  .70 [.33, 1.46]  .62 [.28, 1.40]  .52 [.23, 1.21]  
 South Atlantic  1.22 [.66, 2.27]  1.14 [.58, 2.23]  1.15 [.57, 2.31]  
 East South Central  1.29 [.60, 2.77]  1.26 [.56, 2.80]  1.31 [.57, 2.97]  
 West South Central  omitted  omitted  omitted  
 Pacific  .99 [.48, 2.04]      .90 [.41, 1.97] .79 [.35, 1.79]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      1.01 [.98, 1.05]  1.01 [.98, 1.05]  
 Felony Division      0.59 [.34, 1.02] + .59 [.33, 1.05] + 
 Head Prosecutor          .95 [.52, 1.73] 1.01 [.55, 1.87]  
 Age        .99 [.96, 1.02]  .99 [.96, 1.02]  
 Female       .75 [.47, 1.17]  .71 [.44, 1.13]  
 Not White       1.91 [.91, 4.00] + 2.03 [.96, 4.32] + 
 Hispanic      .33 [.10, 1.14] + .27 [.08, .94] * 
Penalty Recommendations         
 Confinement       1.89 [1.15, 3.09] * 
 Felony Charge       .44 [.23, .85] * 
 Number of Charges       1.09 [.96, 1.23]  
 Constant .63 [.41, .95] * .47 [.14, 1.53]  1.01 [.12, 8.37]  .95 [.10, 8.69]  
 Pseudo R - squared .0073 .0440 .0640 .0896 
 N= 441 432 409 406 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level,  
***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
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Table 6 -- Monetary Penalty Recommendation (Amount) Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental Conditions and 
Jurisdiction Characteristics 
Model 3: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, and Prosecutor 
Characteristics 
Model 4: Experimental Conditions, 
Jurisdiction Characteristics, 
Prosecutor Characteristics, and 
Penalty Recommendations 
 Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  34.62 [-124.53, 193.77]  60.47 [-101.11, 222.06]  41.50 [-128.77, 211.77]   30.37 [-139.29, 200.02]  
 Black Fast food  87.07 [-75.41, 249.54]  93.89 [-71.53, 259.31]   91.84 [-83.39, 267.06]  83.16 [-91.07, 257.38]  
 White Accountant  100.61 [-60.86, 262.09]  107.35 [-55.21, 269.90]  116.47 [-56.10, 289.05]  108.30 [-63.42, 280.02]     
 White Fast food -57.93 [-217.98, 102.13]  -48.44 [-209.13, 112.24]  -57.56 [-228.30, 113.19]  -62.49 [-231.72, 106.74]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    -.85 [-2.56, .86]  -.65 [-2.46, 1.16]  -.64 [-2.44, 1.16]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  1.99 [-60.83, 64.80]  6.92 [-61.77, 75.61]  -.16 [-68.52, 68.20]  
 New England  -343.46 [-605.62, -81.30] ** -280.52 [-561.29, .26] * -248.76 [-529.14, 31.62] + 
 Middle Atlantic  -262.82 [-554.42, 28.78] + -246.68 [-552.00, 58.63]  -305.05 [-612.55, 2.46] + 
 Midwest  -161.84 [-324.19, .51] + -137.21 [-312.49, 38.07]  -115.47 [-291.45, 60.52]  
 West North Central  -244.60 [-440.16, -49.04] * -212.44 [-428.90, 4.02] + -230.95 [-446.43, -15.47] * 
 South Atlantic  -17.38 [-180.78, 146.02]  4.04 [-174.97, 183.05]  -.39 [-179.82, 179.04]  
 East South Central  -142.51 [-345.28, 60.26]  -145.45 [-358.17, 67.26]  -121.86 [-334.01, 90.30]  
 West South Central  91.68 [-391.00, 574.36]  97.62 [-407.88, 603.13]  139.50 [-362.51, 641.50]  
 Pacific       -64.80 [-258.57, 128.98]   -36.82 [-248.54, 174.90] -54.09 [-264.93, 156.75]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      -6.98 [-16.03, 2.07]  -6.43 [-15.47, 2.60]  
 Felony Division      12.07 [-128.61, 152.75]  37.27 [-103.37, 177.92]  
 Head Prosecutor          34.27 [-122.48, 191.02] 46.46 [-109.57, 202.50]  
 Age       1.30 [-6.22, 8.82]  .94 [-6.56, 8.44]  
 Female      -36.60 [-152.85, 79.65]  -43.37 [-158.81, 72.08]  
 Not White     2.90 [-188.53, 194.34]  4.05 [-185.98, 194.09]  
 Hispanic     -132.76 [-407.80, 142.28]  -168.04 [-441.27, 105.20]  
Penalty Recommendations         
 Confinement       178.06 [50.99, 305.13] ** 
 Felony Charge       -81.45 [-240.97, 78.06]  
 Number of Charges       19.94 [-10.42, 50.30]  
 Constant 210.83 [97.00, 324.67] *** 328.11 [29.45, 626.76] * 316.82 [-231.12, 864.76]  243.15 [-310.45, 796.76]  
 R - squared .0119 .0492 .0651 .0894 
 N= 422 418 398 397 








Table 7-- Confinement Recommendation (Yes/No) Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: 
Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental 
Conditions and Jurisdiction 
Characteristics 




Model 4: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, Prosecutor 
Characteristics, and Penalty 
Recommendations 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  .74 [.38, 1.43]  .66 [.33, 1.31]  .68 [.33, 1.40]  .63 [.29, 1.37]  
 Black Fast food  .94 [.49, 1.80]  .84 [.43, 1.67]  .79 [.38, 1.65]  .87 [.40, 1.88]  
 White Accountant  .97 [.50, 1.87]  .84 [.43, 1.66]  .79 [.39, 1.62]  .83 [.39, 1.78]     
 White Fast food .94 [.50, 1.79]  .88 [.45, 1.70]  .74 [.36, 1.50]  .83 [.39, 1.75]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    1.10 [1.00, 1.01]  1.00 [.99, 1.01]  1.00 [.99, 1.01]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  1.19 [.91, 1.57]  1.15 [.85, 1.56]  1.15 [.84, 1.59]  
 New England  .12 [.02, .96] * .15 [.02, 1.25] + .22 [.03, 1.85]  
 Middle Atlantic  1.30 [.43, 3.94]  1.94 [.60, 6.26]  2.05 [.59, 7.16]  
 Midwest  .65 [.34, 1.24]  .84 [.41, 1.72]  .97 [.45, 2.10]  
 West North Central  1.32 [.63, 2.80]  1.60 [.69, 3.71]  1.54 [.63, 3.77]  
 South Atlantic  .81 [.41, 1.59]  .99 [.47, 2.10]  .75 [.34, 1.66]  
 East South Central  .36 [.13, .96] * .45 [.16, 1.26]  .49 [.17, 1.38]  
 West South Central  omitted  Omitted  omitted  
 Pacific       1.04 [.49, 2.19]      1.56 [.69, 3.53] 1.74 [.75, 4.07]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      1.00 [.96, 1.04]  1.00 [.96 1.05]  
 Felony Division      .42 [.21, .83] * .51 [.25, 1.03] + 
 Head Prosecutor             .85 [.45, 1.60] .85 [.43, 1.69]  
 Age       1.00 [.97, 1.03]  1.00 [.96, 1.03]  
 Female      1.10 [.67, 1.81]  1.15 [.69, 1.93]  
 Not White     .67 [.29, 1.56]  .57 [.24, 1.38]  
 Hispanic     2.33 [.82, 6.59]  2.63 [.89, 7.80] + 
Penalty Recommendations         
 Monetary Penalty       1.90 [1.16, 3.11] * 
 Felony Charge       2.28 [1.20, 4.36] * 
 Number of Charges       1.17 [1.02, 1.33] * 
 Constant .41 [.26, .64] *** .26 [.07, .94] * .37 [.04, 3.83]  .13 [.01, 1.57]  
 Pseudo R - squared .0019 .0365 .0596 .1048 
 N= 451 443 417 406 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level,  
***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
  




Table 8-- Confinement Recommendation (Minimum Days) Regression, with Blinded Condition as Reference Category 
  Model 1: 
Experimental 
Conditions 
Model 2: Experimental 
Conditions and Jurisdiction 
Characteristics 
Model 3: Experimental Conditions, 
Jurisdiction Characteristics, and 
Prosecutor Characteristics 
Model 4: Experimental 
Conditions, Jurisdiction 
Characteristics, Prosecutor 
Characteristics, and Penalty 
Recommendations 
 Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] Coeff [CI] 
Experimental Conditions        
 Black Accountant  -1.63 [-21.53, 18.27]  -2.38 [-22.80, 18.04]  .40 [-20.97, 21.76]  8.73 [-10.94, 28.39]  
 Black Fast food  2.84 [-17.58, 23.25]  3.50 [-17.44, 24.43]  8.02 [-14.07, 30.12]  19.51 [-.78, 39.80] + 
 White Accountant  -9.21 [-29.69, 11.27]  -8.85 [-29.58, 11.88]  -5.17 [-26.80, 16.46]  6.74 [-13.22, 26.70]     
 White Fast food 3.48 [-16.47, 23.44]  2.87 [-17.35, 23.08]  3.90 [-17.24, 25.03]  10.59 [-8.97, 30.16]  
Jurisdiction Characteristics        
 Size of Office    .04 [-.18, .26]  .01 [-.22, .24]  0.01 [-.20, .22]  
 Size of Jurisdiction  -3.48 [-11.55, 4.59]  -4.80 [-13.53, 3.94]  -3.17 [-11.17, 4.82]  
 New England  -20.40 [-54.32, 13.52]  -16.21 [-51.92, 19.50]  -6.44 [-39.49, 26.62]  
 Middle Atlantic  6.62 [-32.27, 45.52]  13.20 [-26.92, 53.32]  18.57 [-19.53, 56.67]  
 Midwest  -4.07 [-24.18, 16.05]  2.13 [-19.43, 23.69]  5.96 [-14.21, 26.13]  
 West North Central  1.68 [-23.33, 26.69]  5.15 [-21.64, 31.95]  10.22 [-14.54, 34.98]  
 South Atlantic  6.89 [-14.03, 27.81]  11.48 [-11.31, 34.27]  5.89 [-15.07, 26.85]  
 East South Central  -8.79 [-34.85, 17.28]  -3.38 [-30.41, 23.65]  5.33 [-19.56, 30.22]  
 West South Central  -17.52 [-87.14, 52.10]  -15.64 [-86.96, 55.67]  2.06 [-63.14, 67.26]  
 Pacific  4.51 [-19.33, 28.36]        12.08 [-13.87, 38.02] 13.31 [-10.63, 37.25]  
Prosecutor Characteristics         
 Time as Prosecutor      -.13 [-1.25, .98]  .03 [-.99, 1.06]  
 Felony Division      -10.94 [-28.27, 6.40]  -4.54 [-20.67, 11.58]  
 Head Prosecutor             -5.91 [-25.04, 13.23] -.34 [-18.29, 17.61]  
 Age       -.33 [-1.26, .60]  -.29 [-1.15, .56]  
 Female      .04 [-14.81, 14.88]  .27 [-13.41, 13.95]  
 Not White     -27.16 [-51.11, -3.22] * -27.20 [-49.30, -5.10] * 
 Hispanic     56.13 [21.88, 90.39] *** 56.77 [25.44, 88.09] *** 
Penalty Recommendations         
 Monetary Penalty       -9.96 [-23.19, 3.27]  
 Felony Charge       70.94 [52.26, 89.62] *** 
 Number of Charges       .54 [-3.01, 4.09]  
 Constant 22.21 [8.02, 36.40] ** 35.34 [-3.06, 73.75] + 65.00 [-3.54, 133.54] + 25.15 [-39.73, 90.03]  
 R - squared .0043 .0235 .0637 .2085 
 N= 442 439 414 403 
Note: +=statistical significance at .10 level, *=statistical significance at .05 level, **=statistical significance at or below .01 level,  
***=statistical significance at or below .001 level 
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